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Introduction
In 2007, the UN general Assembly adopted the landmark UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).1 This declaration recognises the right of indigenous
peoples to self-determination, by virtue of which they can freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. The
significance of this document for indigenous peoples and, more broadly, for the
development of human rights cannot be underestimated. In effect, the declaration
provides the first universal instrument to recognise and elaborate the content of the right
to self-determination for indigenous peoples. It is also the first instrument to recognise
the right of self-determination for peoples other than peoples territorially organised as
states and colonies. Considering the contentious nature of recognising the right of self-
determination for a segment of the population of a particular state, the recognition of the
right of indigenous peoples to self-determination therefore constitutes a remarkable
innovation under international law.
Yet, the adoption of the declaration has not solved all controversies and the
implementation  of  the  right  to  self-determination  remains  a  contentious  issue  in
practice. Ten years after the adoption of UNDRIP, there is still a lack of understanding
as to what is really meant by the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination. For
indigenous peoples, self-determination implies their right to control their own destiny
and to  maintain  their  distinct  identity  and  livelihoods.  This  also  includes  their  right  to
manage their traditional land and natural resources. Concurrently, many states remain
suspicious of recognising the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination. In
particular, they fear that the recognition of self-determination will jeopardise the
political  unity  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  state  as  well  as  challenge  its  sovereignty
over natural resources, even though indigenous claims do not necessarily imply the need
for sovereign statehood. In this regard, the question arises as to how the UNDRIP
manages and accommodates these conflicting and paradoxical positions.
To answer this question, this study takes a human rights approach to the development of
the law of self-determination and a multidimensional conceptual perspective to describe
the content of the right in relation to indigenous peoples. From a doctrinal standpoint,
this approach is linked to the development of self-determination as a basis for
democratic governance,2 but also goes beyond that in so far as it does not confine self-
determination within the political governance of sovereign states. In this regard, this
study challenges to some extent the internal/external dichotomy, as it has been well
posited by Casesse,3 instead supporting a relational and human rights perspective, as
1 UN General Assembly, Resolution 61/295. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (hereinafter, the UNDRIP), 2007.
2 Thomas M. Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, American Journal of
International Law 86, no. 1 (1992): 46–91.
3 Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995).
posited by Young or Anaya in their writing.4  On this basis, the objective of this study is
therefore also to explain the significance of indigenous self-determination consistently
with human rights law while questioning the limits of the orthodox interpretation of
self-determination under international law.
For the purpose of this analysis, the argument is divided into two main parts. The first
section focuses on recognition of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination
and situates the right within the contemporary development of international law on self-
determination. Then, the second section examines the content of the right of indigenous
peoples to self-determination while taking a multidimensional conceptual perspective to
explain the significance of the right and examine more particularly its political, resource
and external dimensions.
1. The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination: a Human Rights Approach
In 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the UNDRIP by a significant margin of 143
states being in favour of the declaration, 12 abstentions and four negative votes. Under
Article 3, the declaration unambiguously stipulates that indigenous peoples, treated as a
group of peoples rather than individual citizens, have the collective right to exercise the
right to self-determination. While Article 3 does not stipulate any limitation for its
exercise, the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination is however not absolute.
According to Article 46 of the declaration, self-determination should be exercised in
respect to the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.
Thus, the UNDRIP does not recognise the right of indigenous peoples to create new
states, thereby dissociating the right of indigenous peoples from an end-state approach,
as asserted during the decolonisation period.
Yet, the UNDRIP should not be interpreted as preventing indigenous peoples’ claim to
secession. According to Scheinin and Åhren, such an approach would otherwise be
discriminatory.5 In their own words: ‘why should Indigenous peoples, populations and
groups not be entitled to pursue a quest for secession or far reaching autonomy within
the state when this avenue is open to other peoples, communities and groups?’ 6
Although it is questionable whether any peoples are entitled to secession under
international law,7 it is indeed arguable that in the absence of further developments at
the international level on this topic, it would be problematic to prevent all indigenous
4 See, in particular, Iris Marion Young, ‘Two Concepts of Self-Determination’, in Ethnicity, Nationalism,
and Minority Rights, ed. Stephen May, Tariq Modood, and Judith Squires (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004); James Anaya, ‘The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the
Post-Declaration Era’, in Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ed. Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Copenhagen: IWGIA,
2009), 184–99.
5 Martin Scheinin and Mattias Åhren, ‘Relationship to Human Rights, and Related International
Instruments’, in The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary, Jessie
Hohmann, Marc Weller, Oxford Commentaries on International Law (Oxford, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2017), 72.
6 Scheinin and Åhren, 72.
7 On the doctrine of remedial session, see, e.g. Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-
Determination, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1978).  See also the icj Kosovo Case,
Accordance
with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory
Opinion, i.c.j. Reports 2010, para. 82 and Reference Re secession of Quebec, 2 scr 217, 1998, Supreme
Court of Canada, para. 134.
peoples from claiming the right to secession. Furthermore, it must also be stressed that
indigenous peoples, who fall under the scope of international law on decolonisation, are
still entitled to claim independence. This is, for instance, the case of self-governing
territories such as Greenland or New Caledonia. However, it must equally be
emphasised that the right to self-determination by indigenous peoples is not necessarily
fulfilled by decolonisation of the broader territory in which they live alongside others.8
Self-determination has many aspects beyond statehood and the formal independent
status of any territory.9 In this regard, for the purpose of the UNDRIP the relevance of
the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, while not preventing indigenous
peoples’ claim for statehood, is situated elsewhere.
Pursuant to the drafting process and the provisions of the UNDRIP, the right of
indigenous peoples to self-determination is grounded in human rights law. In
accordance with Article 1 of the UN Human Rights Covenants, which equally proclaims
the right of all peoples to self-determination, the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination is also more specifically connected with the regime of human rights law
on  self-determination.  In  fact,  with  the  adoption  of  Article  1  of  the  UN  Covenants,  it
became increasingly clear that self-determination was not only a right for colonised
peoples,  but  also  a  right  belonging  to  ‘all  peoples’.  In  this  context,  the  Human Rights
Committee (HRC), charged with providing authoritative interpretations of the norms
contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), has
interpreted Article 1 as the right of peoples to choose the form of their constitution or
government.10 Contrary to the colonial variant of self-determination, this latter form of
self-determination must therefore be exercised within the confines of existing states,
while at the same time respecting the principle of the territorial integrity of sovereign
states. International doctrine has labelled this interpretation of the right as ‘internal self-
determination’.11 However, one caveat with respect to internal self-determination lies in
its focus on individual rights and the fact that it was not intended to give rights at the
level of only some groups residing in one state. Accordingly, the right for indigenous
peoples  contrasts  with  the  post-colonial  approach  of  self-determination  in  so  far  as  it
recognises and protects the collective identity of indigenous peoples as a polity, as
opposed to merely protecting the right of indigenous peoples as individual citizens.
Yet, the rights of indigenous peoples remain closely intertwined with the human rights
corpus on self-determination. More simply, as explained by Quane, the right of
indigenous peoples to self-determination goes beyond the minimalist concept of internal
self-determination, which has been expanded to include an internal right for a group
living  within  a  particular  state.12 In other words, it is possible to interpret the right of
indigenous peoples to self-determination ‘as a development of the existing right to
internal self-determination, one that can help make it more responsive to the needs and
8 See, e.g. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous and peoples, James Anaya, ‘The
Situation of Kanak People in New Caledonia, France UN Doc.A/HRC/18/35/Add.6’, 2011, para. 14–
17.
9 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous and peoples, James Anaya, para.16.
10 See HRC, General Comment No. 25: Article 25 UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, 1996, para 2.
11 See for instance Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples; Allan Rosas, ‘Internal Self-Determination’, in
Modern Law of Self-Determination Modern Law of Self-Determination, ed. Christian Tomuschat
(Dordrecht: Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 225–52.
12 Helen Quane, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: New Directions for Self-
Determination and Participatory Rights?’, in Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, ed. Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 262.
interests of indigenous groups’.13 As such, the right of indigenous peoples serves to
complement and substantiate the right of ‘all’ peoples to self-determination as
proclaimed under Article 1 of the UN Human Rights Covenants. This is also the
position argued by Anaya, former special rapporteur on the rights of indigenous
peoples, who explained in a similar respect that the UNDRIP ‘recognizes that
indigenous peoples have the same right of self-determination enjoyed by other
peoples…. premised on the conception of a universal right of self-determination and, on
that premise, it affirms the extension of that universal right to indigenous peoples’.14
From this perspective, the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination therefore
constitutes a novelty under international law, but this novelty remains grounded within
the  contemporary  regime  of  human  rights  law  concerning  the  right  of  self-
determination.
Although such an understanding of self-determination does not provide the right for
indigenous peoples to ‘full’ self-determination in the traditional sense of the term, it
does have several important merits. First, it is in line with indigenous peoples’ claims,
who ‘themselves have almost uniformly denied aspirations to independent statehood in
demanding self-determination’.15 Second, it is also in compliance with the negotiation
process surrounding the adoption of the declaration, during which time the human rights
model of self-determination detracted from the decolonisation model and the historic
sovereignty arguments of indigenous peoples as a basis for self-determination.16 Such a
conceptualisation of self-determination, introduced by Anaya and supported by Asian,
African and Southern American delegations, does not limit self-determination to a state-
end approach; rather, it is premised on the right of appeal to the universal right of
equality between peoples.17 Finally, this approach is not only consistent with internal
self-determination,  as  enshrined  under  Article  1  of  the  UN  Human  Rights  Covenants,
but has also been endorsed by human right bodies when they recognised the application
of Article 1 of the UN Covenants to the situation of indigenous peoples.18
In conclusion, this conception of self-determination arguably also provides a fuller right
of self-determination than could be achieved through independent statehood. As
explained by Anaya, ‘such a notion, that full self-determination necessarily means a
right to choose independent statehood, ultimately rests on a narrow state-centered vision
of  humanity  and  the  world,  …(which)  is  blind  to  the  contemporary  realities  of  (…)  a
world in which the formal boundaries of statehood do not altogether determine the
ordering of communities and authority’.19 Hence, while such an interpretation of the
right of indigenous peoples to self-determination challenges to some extent traditional
typologies, it also constitutes a valuable enlargement of the human right norm, one that
is more concordant with the contemporary social realities of indigenous peoples and
society at large.
13 Quane, 262.
14 Anaya, ‘The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post-Declaration Era’, 185.
15 Anaya, 185.
16 Andrew K Erueti, ‘The Politics of International Indigenous Rights’, University of Toronto Law Journal
67, no. 4 (2017): 584.
17 Erueti, 583.
18 See, e.g. HRC, Concluding Observation: Norway, UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add/112 (1999), para. 10;
Concluding Observation: Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/103/Add.5 (1999).
19 James Anaya, ‘A Contemporary Definition of the International Norm of Self-Determination’,
Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 31 (1993): 143.
2. A Multidimensional Model of Self-Determination
While the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination should be understood
consistently with the right to internal self-determination as enshrined under human
rights law, its implementation nevertheless requires important changes, even for the
governance of democratic states. Those changes are multidimensional. They include
changes that are linked with the political, resource and external dimensions of the right
to self-determination. The following analysis examines each of these dimensions and
explores the relationship between the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination
and the human rights corpus of self-determination.
2.1. The political dimension of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination
In accordance with the UNDRIP, the political aspect of the right of indigenous peoples
to self-determination is based on two main pillars: the right of indigenous peoples to
autonomy and the right to participate in the decision-making process of the state. This
interpretation stems from Articles 4 and 5 of the UNDRIP, which respectively state:
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right
to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local
affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct
political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their
right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and
cultural life of the State.
From this perspective, the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination is based on
a dual aspect: ‘on the one hand, autonomous governance and, on the other, participatory
engagement’.20 As further explained by Anaya, this dual aspect reflects the position that
indigenous peoples are distinct units but yet joined with and connected to larger
political and social structures, such as the state and the global community itself. 21
Accordingly, the right to self-determination first entails the obligation for states to
recognise indigenous representative institutions. 22  In this respect, Article 31 of the
UNDRIP indicates that indigenous peoples should be free to establish their own
institution, to determine, maintain and develop their structures in accordance with their
own procedure and in compliance with human rights law.23 However, as underlined by
the former Rapporteur, Erica Daes, ‘[t]he true test of self-determination is not whether
Indigenous Peoples have their own institutions of self-determination, legislative
authorities, laws, police, or judges. The true test of self-determination is whether
Indigenous peoples themselves actually feel that they have choices about their way of
life’.24
20 Anaya, ‘The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post-Declaration Era’, 193.
21 Ibid.
22 UNDRIP, Articles 33, 34, 35.
23 UNDRIP, Articles 33-34.
24 Erica-Irene A Daes, ‘Striving for Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples’, in First International
Conference on the Right to Self-Determination & the United States, ed. Y.N. Kly and D. Kly (Geneva,
2001), 58.
In  accordance  with  Article  4  of  the  UNDRIP,  the  right  of  indigenous  peoples  to  self-
determination requires that indigenous peoples autonomously govern their own internal
and local affairs. In this regard, Wheatley also explains that autonomy in political affairs
implies ‘the exercise of government functions by state institutions under the control of
indigenous peoples’.25 This is also in accordance with the view of Scheinin and Ahren,
who indicate that the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination ‘requires a
transfer of jurisdiction from state to political bodies to indigenous peoples’
representative institutions’. 26  In effect, this position is significant because it ‘shifts
decision making power in some instances from the states to the indigenous peoples’,
providing therefore public authority in some areas to indigenous representative
institutions.27 In  this  regard,  Scheinin  and  Åhren  are  also  right  to  underline  that  self-
determination ‘must conceptually go beyond that of the right to consultation’, 28 though
consultation is still an elemental aspect of indigenous self-determination.29
In practice, the tension in implementing indigenous self-determination lies in the
defining of indigenous prerogatives and in the balancing of rights and duties between
states and indigenous institutions, especially regarding the scope of indigenous self-
government. Although the UNDRIP leaves a wide margin of interpretation as to the
scope of the right to autonomy, it is generally agreed that ‘the content of indigenous
affairs is broad and should not be restricted to cultural affairs only’.30 According to the
travaux preparatoires of  the  UNDRIP,  it  also  includes  ‘culture,  religion,  education,
information, media, health, housing, employment, social welfare, economic activities,
land and resources management, environment and entry by non-members, as well as
ways and means for financing these autonomous functions’.31 While the absence of
consensus about the content of autonomy has prevented the adoption of a strict
definition during the drafting process of the declaration, the absence of such a definition
also provides a degree of flexibility, which guarantees that ‘the right can be adjusted to
the particular circumstances of each case’.32 There is indeed no one-size fits all model
of autonomy for indigenous peoples, with each people requiring its own governance
structure designed in accordance with its own needs and interests. However, Scheinin
and Åhren are correct to underline that ‘in the absence of clearer instructions, there are
fairly few signs of such jurisdiction having been transferred from states to indigenous
peoples during the more than ten years that have passed since the adoption of the
UNDRIP’, 33 and this in spite of the fact that the status of the principle of autonomy is
widely ‘confirmed by state practice and by the evidence of the requisite opinio juris’.34
25 Steven Wheatley in International Law Association, ‘The Hague Conference (2010) Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, Interim Report’ (London: International Law Association, 2010), 13.
26 Scheinin and Åhren, ‘Relationship to Human Rights, and Related International Instruments’, 67.
27 Scheinin and Åhren, 67.
28 Scheinin and Åhren, 67.
29 See, e.g. Michael A. Murphy, ‘Representing Indigenous Self-Determination’, The University of
Toronto Law Journal 58, no. 2 (2008): 200.
30 Erica-Irene A Daes, ‘Striving for Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples’, in First International
Conference on the Right to Self-Determination & the United States, Y.N. Kly, D. Kly (Geneva,
2001), 58.
31  Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.15/2 (2005), article
31.
32 Natalia Loukacheva, ‘On Autonomy and Law’, Working Paper Series, Institute on Globalization and
the Human Condition 5, no. 3 (2005): 3.
33 Scheinin and Åhren, ‘Relationship to Human Rights, and Related International Instruments’, 67.
34 International Law Association, ‘The Hague Conference (2010) Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Interim
Report’, 16.
Besides the right to autonomy in internal and local matters, indigenous peoples also
have the right to participate as a collective unit in the decision-making process affecting
them. From this perspective, it means that while indigenous peoples have complete
autonomy in some instances, in other cases they also have the right to full
participation. 35  As explained by Wheatley, beyond the sphere of self-governance
arrangements, the right to self-determination finds ‘expression in the participation
and/or consultation in the rule-making of the State’, which guarantees indigenous
peoples the ‘ability to influence the law- and decision-making processes’. 36  This
understanding is grounded in a relational model of self-determination, which takes into
account the interdependence of peoples and the embeddedness of their relationships
rather than their supposed independence from one another.37 This model ‘emphasizes
the  importance  of  self-government  and  the  need  for  modes  of  shared  decision  making
capable of governing the complex interdependence characteristic of state-indigenous
relationships today’.38 In effect, this conceptualisation is also exemplified in several
provisions of the UNDRIP, such as Article 18, which states that ‘indigenous peoples
have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their
rights, through representatives chosen by themselves’. It is additionally supported by
Article 19, which stipulates the duty of the state to consult and cooperate with
indigenous peoples based on the principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC).
Hence, whereas the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination goes beyond
consultation, a lack of adequate consultation undoubtedly undermines the ability of
indigenous peoples to exercise their right to self-determination.
While such an approach to self-determination approach is in compliance with the view
that indigenous peoples are distinct but connected polities, this interpretation also stands
in  contrast  with  the  original  interpretation  of  the  right  of  participation,  which  has
traditionally been considered as an individual right of each citizen. This position was
reflected in the Miqmak case, when the HRC concluded in 1991 that Article 25 of the
Covenant could ‘not be understood as meaning that any directly affected group (of
indigenous peoples), large or small, has the unconditional right to choose the modalities
of participation in the conduct of public affairs’.39 In this regard, the HRC did not
provide any specification about the right of indigenous peoples to participation or self-
government, leaving the process or modalities of participation entirely to the discretion
of the state parties.40 As rightly argued by Quane, the formulation of the UNDRIP
provisions are therefore ‘generally groundbreaking’ because they suggest that ‘new
structures or modalities of participation are required by virtue of international human
rights standards, rather than as is the current position being dependent on the discretion
of the State concerned’.41
35 See also Scheinin and Åhren, ‘Relationship to Human Rights, and Related International Instruments’,
67.
36 International Law Association, ‘The Hague Conference (2010) Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Interim
Report’, 12.
37 Iris Marion Young, Global Challenges: War, Self Determination and Responsibility for Justice
(Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 50–51.
38 Murphy, ‘Representing Indigenous Self-Determination’, 185.
39 HRC, Marshall et al. v. Canada Communication No. 205/l9864, UN Doc CCPR/C/43/D/205/l986,
(1991), para. 5.5.
40 Ibid., para.5.4.
41 Quane, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, 273.
Although the UNDRIP does not impose any particular procedure to ensure the
collective participation of indigenous peoples, it puts the obligation on the respective
state to guarantee that this right is effectively guaranteed. In this regard, Wheathey is
correct to indicate that for participation to be substantially effective, indigenous peoples
must have ‘the capacity to influence the outcomes of decision-making processes’.42 In
this regard, the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination goes against a
minimalist and instrumentalist conception of the duty to consult, but is concordant with
a human rights approach to consultation, one which provides the ‘means of building
trust that can lead to agreed-upon outcomes for the implementation of projects that are
both beneficial  to indigenous peoples and to the society at  large’.43Thus, beyond mere
autonomy, the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples also requires states to
consult and include them as equal political entities in the governance process affecting
them.
2.2. The resource dimension of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination
Besides the political dimension, the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination
also includes a resource component that lies in the rights of indigenous peoples to freely
dispose of their natural wealth and resources. However, the definition of this dimension
of self-determination remains controversial. Traditionally, the rights to control land and
natural resources has been interpreted under international law as an aspect of the
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR).44 In this respect,
states have often opposed the recognition of indigenous rights to land and natural
resources out of fear that those rights could impair their sovereignty over such lands and
natural resources. By contrast, indigenous peoples have continuously emphasised the
fact that  land and natural  resources’ rights were crucial  elements of their  right to self-
determination.
In the light of this controversy, Erica Daes was appointed by the Economic and Social
Council during the drafting process of the UNDRIP to conduct a ‘study on indigenous
peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources’.45 Based on the comments made
by governments and on the data received from indigenous representatives and NGOs,
the rapporteur argues that the principle of PSNR applies to indigenous peoples, short of
economic independence. In her words, PSNR for indigenous peoples ‘does not mean the
supreme  authority  of  an  independent  State’,  and  ‘use  of  the  term  in  relation  to
indigenous  peoples  does  not  place  them  on  the  same  level  as  States  or  place  them  in
conflict with State sovereignty’.46 Instead, what PSNR for indigenous peoples involves
is ‘governmental control and authority over the resources in the exercise of self-
determination’.47  It  is  ‘a  collective  right  by  virtue  of  which  States  are  obligated  to
respect, protect, and promote the governmental and property interests of indigenous
42 International Law Association, ‘The Hague Conference (2010) Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Interim
Report’, 14.
43 James Anaya and Sergio Puig, ‘Mitigating State Sovereignty: The Duty to Consult with Indigenous
Peoples’, University of Toronto Law Journal 67, no. 4 (2017): 462.
44 For a general overview, see Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and
Duties (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
45 Daes, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources', UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30 (2004).
46 Ibid., para 18.
47 Ibid.
peoples (as collectivities) in their natural resources’.48 Hence, with respect to indigenous
peoples, Daes argues that PSNR does not confer upon them absolute sovereignty over
their traditional land and resources, but nevertheless implies their right to exercise self-
determination in relation with their traditional lands and resources.49
From  this  standpoint,  it  is  therefore  more  adequate  to  speak  about  the  right  of
indigenous peoples to self-determination over their lands and resources rather than their
right to PSNR. Such an approach is also in better compliance with the shift of emphasis
from a decolonisation approach to a human rights approach to the right of self-
determination, which occurred during the adoption process of the UNDRIP.50 It is also
supported by the HRC, which has confirmed in several concluding observations the
application of Article 1.2 to the situation of indigenous peoples.51 However,  such  a
position is also novel under international law. Never before has a piece of human rights
law required a state to recognise the distinct interests of one segment of its population.
Traditionally, the right to economic self-determination had been recognised as a right of
non-self-governing territories and, more recently, as a right of the population of the state
to freely dispose of its natural wealth and resources.52 Even the intra-state application of
the right did not concern the differential application of the rights to one particular
segment of the population. As a result, the assertion of the right of indigenous peoples
to self-determination over their natural resources not only expands the reach of the
democratic understanding of self-determination beyond its political realm. It also
challenges the orthodox understanding of economic self-determination by providing
specific entitlement for indigenous peoples over their lands and resources within the
state in which they live.
Although the rights of indigenous peoples remain contested and the UNDRIP does not
wholly clarify relevant international law, the legal implications of the resource
dimension of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination are outlined to some
extent under several provisions. At the outset, the right of indigenous peoples to govern
and manage land and resources necessarily includes the right to control their traditional
land and resources as a basis for maintaining and developing their livelihoods. As
underscored by Wheatley, ‘indeed, control over traditional lands is the key feature of
indigenous peoples’ autonomy, conceived as an element of self-determination’. 53
Accordingly, Article 26 of the UNDRIP indicates that indigenous peoples’ rights to land
and resources include the right of indigenous peoples ‘to own, use, develop and control
the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership
or other traditional occupation’ and the correlative duty for the state to recognise and
48 Ibid., para 40.
49 UNDRIP, Article 26.
50 Erueti, ‘The Politics of International Indigenous Rights’.
51HRC, Concluding Observation: Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105 (1999), para.8; Concluding
Observation: Australia, UN Doc. A/55/40, vol. I (2000), para. 506- 507; Concluding Observation:
Sweden, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE (2002), para.15; Concluding Observation: Mexico, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/MEX/CO/5 (2010), para. 22;
52 Alice Farmer, ‘Towards a Meaningful Rebirth of Economic Self-Determination: Human Rights
Realization in Resource-Rich Countries’, New York University Journal of International Law and
Politics New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 39, no. 2 (2006): 417–73;
Emeka Duruigbo, ‘Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources in
International Law’, George Washington International Law Review. 38, no. 1 (2006): 33–100.
53 International Law Association, ‘The Hague Conference (2010) Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Interim
Report’, 13.
protect these lands, territories and resources.54 Although some ambiguity remains as to
the content of these rights, the adoption of the declaration has been instrumental in
confirming that states must take action in recognising indigenous rights to land and
resources at the domestic level. Furthermore, since the adoption of the declaration, an
increasing  body  of  human  rights  law  has  underlined  the  duty  of  states  concerning  the
rights of indigenous peoples to land, while stressing the obligation of governments to
demarcate indigenous lands, 55  to recognise their systems of land tenure, 56  or to
‘strengthen legislative and administrative measures in order to guarantee the rights of
indigenous peoples to their land and to freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources’.57 As already mentioned, several recommendations have also emphasised the
rights of indigenous peoples to lands and resources under the scope of the right to self-
determination, as enshrined under Article 1 of the Human rights Covenants.58 Hence,
this development not only expands and clarifies the content of indigenous peoples’
rights to land and natural resources, but also confirms that indigenous peoples have the
rights  to  land  and  natural  resources  consistent  with  the  human  right  of  self-
determination.
Given the important jurisdictional interdependences in the governance of indigenous
lands and natural resources, the right of indigenous peoples to manage their lands and
natural resources also entails their right to participate in decision-making processes
affecting them, which extends their authority beyond self-government arrangements.
From the participatory lens, the resource aspect of the right of indigenous peoples to
self-determination includes more specifically the right of indigenous peoples to
participate in the development of the resources located in their territories, including
subsoil resources such as oil and gas. This interpretation is derived from Article 32 of
the UNDRIP, which stipulates in the following, often quoted, paragraph:
indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and
strategies  for  the  development  or  use  of  their  lands  or  territories  and  other
resources and that states have the duty to consult and cooperate in good faith
with the indigenous peoples concerned (…) in order to obtain their free and
informed  consent  prior  to  the  approval  of  any  project  affecting  their  lands  or
territories and other resources.
The principle of FPIC, which is at  the heart  of Article 32, is  also a cornerstone of the
resource aspect of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination. FPIC implies
that it is not sufficient for the state to consult with indigenous peoples when a decision
will affect their traditional territories. In addition, the principle requires that states fully
engage with the concerned indigenous communities with the requirement to seek
consent. Although the implementation of FPIC is still a controversial issue under
international law, there is a growing corpus of decisions demonstrating the importance
of the principle for the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights to land and resources.
An important number of recommendations on state reports by the HRC and CESR have,
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for instance, emphasised that states should ‘ensure that prior consultations are held with
a view to obtaining their free, prior and informed consent regarding decisions that affect
them’, 59  and that the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples
concerned should be obtained before granting licences to private companies.
Additionally,  the  Expert  Mechanism  on  the  Rights  of  Indigenous  Peoples  has  also
stressed  the  importance  of  FPIC for  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  indigenous  peoples  to
self-determination, while at the same time emphasising that ‘States should also
recognise that the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples constitutes a duty
for States to obtain indigenous peoples’ free, prior and informed consent, not merely to
be involved in decision-making processes, but a right to determine their outcomes’.60
Thus,  the  regimes  of  consultation  based  on  FPIC underlie  an  instrumental  principle  to
operationalise self-determination in the context of developing traditional indigenous
lands and territories. 61  This approach is based on a relational model of self-
determination where ‘regimes of consultation play a crucial role in ensuring that
indigenous peoples are provided with a meaningful opportunity to influence, and in
some case to veto government policies that impact their rights and interests’.62
Although  the  role  of  FPIC  and  the  duty  to  obtain  consent  remains  disputed,  it  is
increasingly agreed that projects significantly jeopardising indigenous livelihoods
require their approval. For instance, actual consent, as opposed to consultation, is
required by the UNDRIP in the case of relocation (Art. 10) as well as storage and
disposal of hazardous materials on indigenous lands (Art. 29). In similar respects, both
the HRC and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have indicated that
consultation is not sufficient in cases of large-scale development projects undertaken on
traditional indigenous lands and territories that significantly affect their livelihoods.63
Instead, FPIC is also required prior to initiating such projects, which indicates that the
principle includes a qualified right to veto.64 As such, the human rights application of
FPIC utilises a ‘sliding scale approach to participatory rights’, one which recognises
that the ‘level of effective participation is essentially a function of the nature and
content of the rights and activities in question’.65  This  also  means  that  the  degree  of
participation of indigenous peoples and their right to object to a particular project will
vary in accordance with the impact of the measure on their rights. The ramifications of
FPIC are significant for the development of international law. This is especially the case
since the application of the principle conflicts with ‘the ideas of democracy and political
equality  of  citizens’,  which  emphasise  ‘that  no  individual  or  group  within  the  society
should be provided with a veto over legislation with majority support’.66 By contrast,
the principle of FPIC corroborates the idea that the exercise of the right of indigenous
peoples to self-determination requires the collective protection of their distinct
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livelihoods, even when it is in conflict with the societal interests supported by the rest of
the population. Hence, the application of FPIC supports a pluralist conception of
democratic governance that finds application with the exercise of the right of
indigenous peoples to self-determination without challenging the sovereignty of
independent states.
2.3. The international dimension of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination
The livelihoods of indigenous peoples are not inescapably confined to the territories of
sovereign states. In this regard, it appears logical to include an external or international
dimension to the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination.67 However, as far as
this dimension of self-determination is concerned, it does not necessarily entail the right
to secession for indigenous peoples. Instead, what this dimension of self-determination
includes is the right of indigenous peoples to protect their collective integrity while
participating in and influencing development processes in accordance with their own
viewpoints. Given overlapping interests among indigenous and other communities and
‘the extension of political power and political activities across the boundaries of the
modern-states’,68 self-determination need not only apply within the state, but should be
extended to other governance spheres of society as well.69  As also eloquently explained
by Anaya, ‘any model of self-determination that does not take into account the larger
context of multiple patterns of human association and interdependency is at best
incomplete (and is more likely distorted) … appropriately understood, therefore, self-
determination concerns human beings in regard to the constitution and functioning of all
levels and forms of government under which they live’. 70  This approach is also
grounded in a relational model of self-determination that speaks both about local
autonomy and the need to govern the complex interdependent relationship between
indigenous peoples and non-indigenous groups at the national, transnational and
international levels.71 Furthermore, this understanding is also in agreement with the
principle  of  global  democracy,  ‘where  the  demos  is  not  limited  to  a  conception  of  a
people resident in a given territory (although it applies there) but pertains to all
institutional contexts of decision-making’. 72  Thus, from this perspective self-
determination is not a mere appendage of territorial sovereignty, but benefits individuals
and groups in regard to all forms of governance processes under which they live.
From a legal standpoint, the right to self-determination in its international dimension is
still incompletely enshrined under current international legal instruments. Nevertheless,
several  provisions  of  the  UNDRIP allude  to  this  dimension  in  relation  to  the  rights  of
indigenous peoples. Article 36, for instance, stipulates that indigenous peoples, in
particular those divided by international borders, have the right to maintain and develop
contacts,  relations  and  cooperation  (…)  with  their  own  members  as  well  as  other
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peoples across borders. As explained by Wheatley, this provision is ‘aimed at avoiding
the deleterious consequences that the establishment of State boundaries has on the life
of indigenous people belonging to the same cultural community that are divided by
international borders’. 73  In  this  regard,  States  are  required  to  facilitate  the  contacts
between indigenous peoples across borders through recognising their right to maintain
and develop cross-border contacts with other peoples. An example of the application of
such rights is the institutional arrangement developed by the Sami people across the
borders of Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden.74 Despite the borders that separate
them,  the  Sami  people  are  involved  in  different  institutional  arrangements,  more
specifically the Sami Parliamentary Council, which allows for their transnational
institutional representation. 75 Although  these  arrangements  are  still  far  from  making
self-determination concrete for the Sami as a transnational people, this experience
epitomises the idea of a model of self-determination exercised through autonomous
representation, with the possible transfer of jurisdiction of public authority in some
domains from states to indigenous peoples at the transnational level.76
Besides, the rights of indigenous peoples also includes an international participatory
aspect that provides them with the right to representation and participation in decision-
making processes at the international level. As indicated by Murphy, while local
autonomy is the most obvious route to indigenous empowerment, ‘indigenous
representatives may also need an effective … voice in select transnational institutions
such  as  United  Nations  forums’. 77 Although the right is not clearly stated by the
UNDRIP, it is nonetheless supported by several provisions in the declaration. For
example, Article 18 states that indigenous peoples have the right to participate in
decision-making in matters which would affect their rights. An expansive interpretation
of this provision provides a basis for applying the right of indigenous peoples to
participate not only at the state level, but also at the international level, in governance
process affecting them. This interpretation, which is in fact supported by the travaux
préparatoires of the UNDRIP,78 is  also  concordant  with  Article  41  of  the  declaration,
which enjoins the organs and specialised agencies of the United Nations to establish
ways and means for ensuring the participation of indigenous peoples on issues affecting
them. In effect, the latter provision has given rise to the development of a UN inquiry
about the means to enable indigenous peoples’ effective participation in relevant
meetings of United Nations bodies on issues affecting them through their representative
institutions.79 In 2017, the UN general Assembly adopted a draft resolution proposing
participation and modalities arrangements for the participation of indigenous
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representatives that would allow for their engagement in decision-making processes,
without challenging the primacy of the states in the conduct of international affairs at
the UN level.80 While discussions on the issue are still ongoing, this development is
certainly noteworthy in so far as it supports the idea that indigenous peoples have the
right to distinct representation and effective participation in the international decision-
making processes affecting them. On that account, even though this right remains in
practice inadequately recognised and implemented, as indicated by Special Rapporteur
Claire Charters, ‘it appears to be a clear consensus that Indigenous peoples have the
right to participation at the UN level, consistently with the right to self-determination’.81
Conclusion
The UNDRIP is a remarkable international legal instrument actualising a universal
framework of minimum standards for the survival, dignity, well-being and rights of the
world's indigenous peoples. One of the most important aspects of the declaration is the
recognition of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination. With the adoption
of the UNDRIP, this analysis demonstrates that international law has taken a new step
in the re-conceptualisation of self-determination. Although this development could have
serious ramifications well beyond the case of indigenous peoples, the declaration
nonetheless limits the recognition of self-determination to indigenous peoples in so far
as it does not recognise their right to independent statehood. In this regard, the rights of
indigenous peoples to self-determination, as enshrined under the UNDRIP, must be
implemented in accordance with the principle of territorial integrity and political unity
of sovereign states. However, this fact alone should not eclipse the true relevance of the
UNDRIP. In contrast with an orthodox understanding of self-determination, this
analysis  also  argues  that  the  significance  of  the  UNDRIP  lies  beyond  the  question  of
self-determination exercised in its sovereign form. This understanding, which is in
compliance with most indigenous claims that do not foresee the need for sovereign
statehood to exercise full self-determination, is based on a human rights approach to the
right to self-determination.
From a human rights perspective, the right to self-determination is embedded in
democratic governance. However, because the principle of democratic governance
based on the equality of citizens does not support the collective right of indigenous
peoples, this analysis has also provided evidence of the fact that the right of indigenous
peoples to self-determination challenges to some extent the traditional conceptualisation
of ‘internal self-determination’ by requiring changes in order to protect the distinct
identity of indigenous peoples. For this purpose, the UNDRIP contributes to forging a
more substantive democratic conception of self-determination where diverse collective
units with different identities can equally participate in the governing institutions under
which they live. In this regard, the UNDRIP, while going beyond standards that have
been ascertained under human rights law, still relies on them to inform an interpretation
of the democratic understanding of self-determination. Hence, the right of indigenous
peoples to self-determination represents a novelty under international law, but at the
same time remains a constitutive part of the human rights corpus of law that underlies
the right for all peoples to self-determination.
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Ten years after the adoption of the declaration, and the reaffirmed support for the
instrument, limited progress has nevertheless been evident with respect to the
implementation of self-determination. 82  This lack of progress does not, however,
undermine the legal significance of the UNDRIP, which establishes a solid basis for
implementing the necessary changes. 83  As described in this analysis, the changes
required by the recognition of indigenous self-determination in accordance with the
UNDRIP are multidimensional. At the outset, indigenous self-determination requires
recognition of the distinct political identity of indigenous peoples and their right to
control their local and internal affairs. However, the right to self-determination is not
merely an instrument for indigenous peoples to maintain their distinct identity and
livelihoods. From a human rights perspective, self-determination also implies their
equal participation as a separate collective unit in the decision-making processes that
affect them to allow their self-determined development. Accordingly, indigenous
peoples have the right to govern their own affairs at the local level while retaining their
right to participate in the decision-making processes that affect them. Although the
UNDRIP leaves a wide margin of appreciation as to how to operationalise this right in
practice, the declaration ultimately requires that states adopt new modalities for
allowing indigenous peoples to control their internal and local affairs and to effectively
participate in the governance processes that affect them.
Additionally, this study argues that the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination
goes beyond political rights and includes a resource dimension. This dimension of the
right of indigenous peoples to self-determination requires both the recognition of the
rights of indigenous people to govern their land and resources at the local level and the
duty of the state to consult with indigenous representatives in order to obtain their FPIC
before undertaking development projects that may affect them. In this context, this
study also puts emphasis on the principle of FPIC, which requires the right for
indigenous peoples to be able to effectively influence the outcome of decision-making
processes affecting them, as opposed to merely being consulted. Whereas the
implication of the principle remains contested, the importance of FPIC is primordial for
the  exercise  of  self-determination  in  so  far  as  it  provides  indigenous  peoples  with  the
possibility to determine how their land and resources are developed. Although the
principle does not provide an absolute veto right to indigenous peoples, FPIC provides a
contextual framework of negotiation to ascertain indigenous needs and interests on par
with those of the rest of society, also granting them a right to oppose development
projects in cases where such projects would have a significant impact on their rights.
Finally, the present analysis also suggests that the exercise of the right of indigenous
peoples to self-determination is not confined to state borders. Given the
interdependency of indigenous peoples’ livelihoods with transnational and global
events, the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination must also apply at the
international and transnational levels. With respect to the principle of territorial
integrity,  the  application  of  the  right  to  self-determination  in  this  context  does  not
necessarily entail independent statehood. Rather, self-determination requires the ability
for indigenous peoples to establish and develop their influence in decision-making
processes affecting them across and beyond states boundaries. Although this
interpretation of the right to indigenous self-determination permeates and challenges the
traditional internal/external conception of the right, it is nevertheless more in tune with
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contemporary developments and the global arrangements of society, which transcend
states boundaries. Furthermore, this interpretation remains rooted in a democratic
understanding of self-determination to the extent that it does not seek to challenge the
primacy of democratic states in the conduct of state affairs, but purports instead to
ascertain a more diverse and inclusive governance of society. Thus, although much
progress still needs to occur in order to actualise such a model of self-determination,
this approach to self-determination is novel but consistent with the modern development
of international law. Currently, it is therefore wherein lies the legal significance of the
right of indigenous peoples to self-determination as enshrined by the UNDRIP, as a
right capable of fostering democratic unity, but through diversity.
